Col
R Hariharan
[Answers
to some of the questions on India-Sri Lanka relations and China raised by an
international news agency answered on August 11, 2014 are given here.]
How
do you see the diplomatic, economic, political relationship between Sri Lanka
and India before the end of the war and after the end of the war?
The
multifaceted India-Sri Lanka relationship has undergone subtle changes after
the Eelam War ended in triumph for Rajapaksa. The main reason for this is
President Rajapaksa’s failure to implement 13th Amendment to the
Constitution and trigger the political process with Tamil minority as promised
to India. His act of political
expedience not only destroyed the Indian leadership’s credibility in him but
also the public credibility in the Manmohan Singh coalition’s ability to handle
the relations with India’s neighbours.
Its
tectonic effects in Tamil Nadu politics saw the end of the Congress party’s
fragile relationship with the DMK with disastrous results in the parliamentary
poll for both the parties. It provided a
fillip for anti-Sri Lanka lobbies in Tamil Nadu to gain strength particularly
after Sri Lanka continued to dither on carrying out impartial probe into
allegations of human rights violations towards the end of the war.
At
the diplomatic level, the impact was seen in hesitant swings in India’s support
for Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Commission sessions on Sri Lanka’s
accountability. However, at the functional level both India and Sri Lanka seem
to be keen to maintain some balance in their responses to acts of political and
public provocation on both sides.
China’s
entry in a big way in Sri Lanka is dislocating India-Sri Lanka relations on the
strategic and trade fronts. Strategically India has been put on the defensive
after Sri Lanka signed the Strategic Cooperative Partnership (SCP)
agreement with China and welcomed China’s initiative in promoting ‘Maritime
Silk Route’ (MSR) through the Indian Ocean. India is likely to factor these
developments while moving forward in its relations with China, set to take off
shortly.
Sri
Lanka’s scant recognition of India’s valuable economic and development
assistance at a much lesser cost in public pronouncements show that Sri Lanka
is taking India for granted. This belief is further reinforced by its skewed
trade policy changes giving advantage to China over India show that pro-Chinese
lobbies in Sri Lanka are firmly established. We can expect China to gain further advantage
when it signs the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China by the end of the year,
we can expect Indian trade to be affected further.
Do
you really see Sri Lanka neutralizing Indian influence using China time to time
or as a balancing act?
India
is physically too close and too big for comfort for a small country like Sri
Lanka. So it has always to factor India while mapping its relations with any
other country. At the same time it makes sense for Sri Lanka to develop a
parallel relationship with a big power like China to derive some comfort from
its support.
So
there is no question of Sri Lanka neutralizing Indian influence with its huge
economic and strategic clout in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Sri
Lanka has assiduously cultivated India over the years resulting in flourishing
two-way trade particularly after the signing of FTA with India. Sri Lankan marine
infrastructure is mostly dependent upon Indian shipping for survival.
While
China can erode India’s influence in Sri Lanka, it is doubtful it can ever totally
substitute India. Moreover, China has a bigger stake in building closer strategic
and economic partnership with India. So at present there is little incentive
for China to join hands with Sri Lanka at the cost of better relations with
India. So Sri Lanka can at best try to
take maximum advantage for its own benefit from the developing relationship
between the two Asian giants. I think this is what Sri Lanka is trying to do.
But at what cost to India is the question?
This
should not minimise the strategic advantage China gains from firmly
establishing itself in Sri Lanka. Infrastructures controlled by China in Sri
Lanka will help its strategic build up in the IOR where India is a dominant
power. Sri Lanka becomes a mid way take off point for China’s naval assets to
dominate the sea lanes which would not only safeguard its shipping trade but
interdict others in times of confrontation. It will also augment China’s electronic
intelligence effort targeting not only India but also other powers operating in
the IOR and its periphery.
Now
China is going to start/back an aircraft maintenance service centre in Sri
Lanka and Hambantota port is also going to be under their control at least for
the next three decades. Do you see these projects are purely on economic
interests?
We
should not see these issues in isolation but as responses to multiple
developments in India, Sri Lanka and China. These are part of Chinese effort to
gain a firm hold of the strategic infrastructure in the country. Strategic security in 21st century
is much more than the physical aspect. Every economic activity has a strategic
relevance for China. So the infrastructure assets it is creating now for economic
considerations will always have a strategic context in China’s power projection.
Do
you see increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka is a security concern for
India, though India does not openly say it?
Normally
friendly nations do not share their security concerns about each other in
public. India has been expressing its security concerns to Sri Lanka
diplomatically from time to time. I am sure Sri Lanka also does it. This is
what strategic dialogues are meant for.
China
has actively engaged with a host of countries in the
neighbourhood to rebuild the ancient silk road connecting China with Europe
through the Central Asian States and trade corridors like Bangladesh, China,
India, Myanmar, (BCIM) as well as direct economic corridor with Pakistan
through the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir(PoK). In
this context, how do you see increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka?
This
is a bigger ball game China is playing which would call for analysis of
happenings spread over a huge land mass. I would not venture to answer this in
the present context.
[Col R Hariharan is a retired MI analyst who
served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90).
He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia
Analysis Group. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ]
Courtesy:
South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 5766
Aug 14, 2014
No comments:
Post a Comment