Monday, 11 August 2014

Revival of Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka

Col R Hariharan

Introduction

Recently there was a lot of media hype in Sri Lanka about the attempts of the LTTE’s overseas remnants to reactivate the Tamil insurgent movement in the island. As it invariably happens in Sri Lanka, the reports appear to be a mixture of facts and fiction.

Tamil detractors tried to trash the reports saying they were issued to draw the public attention away from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) March 2014-session in Geneva. 

Probably there is some truth in this as Sri Lanka was facing the flak at the UN body meeting over its accountability for alleged human rights violations in the post war period. But there is an equally strong case to suspect the overseas LTTE trying to get a foothold in Sri Lanka. 

No nation with a traumatic terrorist attacks that Sri Lanka had faced at the hands of the LTTE  for nearly three decades can afford to ignore any sign of its revival. More so, as the LTTE’s overseas network had survived the total destruction of the LTTE and its entire leadership including its founder V Prabhakaran in May 2009. The overseas network has access to LTTE’s assets created and stashed abroad over the years.  These include financial resources and benami holdings overseas in businesses and property. They are waiting to be fully tapped. So Sri Lanka’s concerns on this count are real; it simply cannot afford to allow the LTTE to stage a comeback on its soil.

LTTE’s overseas network

After the war, the remnants of LTTE abroad and its supporters were in a scramble for leadership. It would have enabled them to gain legitimacy to get hold of the LTTE’s assets.  The former militants are now organised into two major groups led by P Sivaparan alias Nediyawan and Vinayagam respectively with the aim of furthering LTTE objectives.

According to Sri Lanka army, Nediyawan based in Norway, leads a covert group that keeps changing its name for fear of being compromised by intelligence agencies. It is believed to have established its cells in various Western countries. Vinayagam, former LTTE intelligence operative based in Paris, leads the Headquarter Group. He is said to be in touch with the LTTE underworld members and criminal elements. Vinayagam had been involved in activities like smuggling of people to Canada, taking care of LTTE investments abroad etc.[i]

The LTTE supporters who have disowned militancy are organised in two segments. The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) to “democratically” struggle for the creation of independent Tamil Eelam is led by ‘Prime Minister’ Rudrakumaran, LTTE’s attorney in the U.S. It has all the trappings of an elected ‘parliament’, ministers etc. Its ‘parliament’ has two members nominated from Tamil Nadu also!

The Global Tamil Forum (GTF) led by one-time LTTE acolyte Father Emmanuel is a vocal and powerful Diaspora body enjoying wider support. It purports to work for finding ways to meet Tamil aspirations within Sri Lanka’s existing political set up. It also articulates Sri Lanka Tamil grievances to the world at large. It has been supporting the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in Sri Lanka and has links with the Tamil Eelam Supporters Organisation (TESO) revived by the DMK party in Tamil Nadu three years back. The British Tamil Forum (BTF), considered more radical than the GTF, parted ways with the latter after a short period of unification.

Internationally, these organisations have been campaigning against President Rajapaksa for alleged war crimes and genocide during the Eelam War and want him to be hauled up before the International Criminal Court (ICC). And they come together to voice their protests whenever President Rajapaksa or any Sri Lankan “war criminals” visit the Western countries.

Sri Lanka Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa recently drew attention to the LTTE network that continued to sustain an international propaganda against Sri Lanka “through front organisations that have put on a democratic face.” He estimated the scale of funds mobilised by the LTTE between US $ 50 to 70 million on an annual basis from 1993 to 2002, and $ 200 million per annum from 2002 to 2008.[ii]

It is not surprising that Sri Lanka is nervous at the rallying of Tamil Diaspora elements particularly the two organisations led by former LTTE leaders. But these set ups are far from the highly disciplined and networked organisation that LTTE had established. Nor do they enjoy wide support among the Diaspora.  And the reports about the Tamil Diaspora trying to revive the LTTE in Sri Lanka have heightened the state’s anxiety.

LTTE revival attempts in Sri Lanka

According to reports based on Sri Lanka army sources, overseas LTTE elements made three attempts to establish a LTTE foothold in Sri Lanka between 2012 and 2014.[iii] None of the attempts have been successful; of Indian interest is their Tamil Nadu connection which has serious connotations for security.

The three attempts are –
a.      March 2012: The investigation of a cadre of Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) (a partner in the ruling UPFA coalition) in Trincomalee District (Eastern Province) led to the revelation about overseas LTTE’s revival attempts. Interrogation of suspects revealed that Kumaran of the Vinayagam faction in Paris recruited 15 former LTTE cadres in Tamil Nadu and organized them into three cells of five members each. One of these cells was sent to Trincomalee in order to carry out the killing of the EPDP cadre in March 2012 who was branded as traitor by them.
b.     December 2012: The arrest and interrogation of a former LTTE cadre in Colombo revealed a clandestine campaign financed by overseas LTTE elements that was underway in Tamil Nadu to recruit and indoctrinate Sri Lankan Tamil youth with LTTE ideology. Tamil Nadu police arrested four occupants of a house in Chennai outskirt of Pammal based on information given by Sri Lanka. One of them was found to head an LTTE team that made explosives. Police recovered incriminating documents, electronic circuit boards and panels from the house.
c.      March 2014: The hunt for a former LTTE cadre Ponniah Selvanayagam Kajeepan, aka Gobi who opened fire on a policeman during a routine check in the Kilinochchi area led to a small LTTE cell. The security forces hunted down and killed not only Gobi, but two other former LTTE cadres, Suntharalingam Gajatheeban, aka Theiveegan, and Navaratnam Navaneethan, aka Appan. Further investigations revealed Theiveegan, a former bodyguard of V Prabhakaran, was in touch with leaders of both the LTTE factions abroad. He had also made many trips to India to keep in touch with contacts there. Subsequently, Sri Lanka has arrested three suspected members of Nediyawan group from Malaysia and their interrogation is underway in Colombo.

Following this, in March 2014 Sri Lanka ordered the freezing of all funds, assets and economic resources belonging to 16 Tamil Diaspora organisations and 424 individuals believed to be “facilitating or participating” in acts of terrorism. Though follow up action on the notification has not yet been activated yet, it gives the option of Sri Lanka government to apply pressure on Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora bodies to desist from supporting the overseas factions of the LTTE. The list of proscribed individuals included 32 persons said to be living in Tamil Nadu.

Paranoia about Tamil terrorism

On the flip side, Sri Lanka government has been keeping the paranoia of Tamil terrorism alive for political reasons. The lingering threat of revival of Tamil terrorism keeps reminding the people of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s achievement in ending Prabhakaran’s “terror regime” once and for all.

Rajapaksa’s achievement in eliminating the LTTE is truly remarkable; it stands out as one of the few success stories against terrorism the world over. His success has restored the shattered morale of the Sinhala majority. As an adroit politician he has cashed on his national popularity to get elected a second time as president. It also helped him to secure an absolute majority in parliament for the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition.[iv] 

Rajapaksa established his grip on power more firmly, by using the parliamentary majority to amend the constitution to remove the bar on incumbent President holding office beyond the second term.[v]

Under the Sri Lankan constitution the President enjoys vast executive powers. He heads the government; he is also commander in chief of armed forces. His brothers Basil and Gotabya are in key jobs wielding enormous power. Basil is the economic development minister while Gotabaya is serving as the Defence Secretary in charge of the armed forces and internal security. 

After the war, the army has emerged as an important instrument of power. Thus with Basil controlling development projects and finance, and the Defence Secretary in charge of the armed forces, the President’s family has gathered enormous power in its hand to  shape Sri Lanka’s policies and practices.  

The threat of LTTE revival has also enabled President Rajapaksa to justify maintaining an oversized army of about 200,000 well-trained soldiers.[vi] Around 30-35 percent of the army is based in permanent camps in the Tamil predominant Northern and Eastern provinces. As the troops are mostly Sinhalas, their large overt presence in the area would discourage any revival of separatist activity. However, large presence of the army in their midst even after their war has caused serious misgivings about the government’s intentions among Tamils.  

An environment for LTTE revival

While the revival of the LTTE in Sri Lanka is possible, the current socio-political environment does not appear conducive for it. Neither the historical context nor the popular upsurge supporting independent Eelam of the 80s that fostered Tamil militancy exists today. India’s forceful and overt support for the Tamil minority that existed till 1990 has also undergone a sea change. India-Sri Lanka relations have grown manifold and multifaceted diminishing the importance of the Tamil issue.   

The rise of Tamil insurgency was the logical sequence to the failure of Sri Lanka to satisfy Tamils political demand for autonomy in the face of State’s increasing emphasis on Sinhala Buddhist culture and language since 1956.  

However, after Sri Lanka politically failed to resolve the demand, an independent Tamil state (Tamil Eelam) became the political watchword of Tamils to preserve their identity, language and traditional areas of habitation. Soon politicians lost their credibility and gave way to Tamil extremism.

The 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo gave credence to Tamil extremism.[vii]  Indian intervention in its wake resulted in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 [ISLA].[viii] The Accord compelled Sri Lanka government to grant a level of autonomy to Northern and Eastern provinces; this was done through the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution. India had agreed to disarm the militants to enable them to join mainstream politics. When LTTE refused to comply, India got involved in a long drawn war with LTTE.  

India withdrew its forces from Sri Lanka due to political changes in both countries in 1990 giving the LTTE a lease of life. India-Sri Lanka relations turned bitter for a while thereafter. India maintained a low profile on Sri Lanka Tamil issue from then onwards. Its stand against the LTTE hardened particularly after Prabhakaran carried out the mindless killing of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Perhaps Tamil militancy lost India’s sympathy forever.
After the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the US, the international environment against terrorism has undergone radical changes. The world is more united than ever before in fighting terrorism of all hues. Thanks to modern technology tools, the dividing line between militancy and terrorism is fading. Classical militant movements of the 60 cannot survive now unless they have political backing. So the external support of the kind that LTTE enjoyed in 80s is available anymore for the LTTE revival exercise.

Internally, the Tamil population has been demoralized after the war. They have lost their livelihood, kith and kin and habitations in three decades of militancy. They are looking for survival strategies rather than separate homeland. With huge military presence in their midst, Tamils would be wary of supporting any militancy for fear of retribution from the state. In this environment, any leader attempting to revive LTTE will find it extremely difficult to find support among the population.

Prabhakaran’s leadership

Prabhakaran’s charismatic leadership was responsible for motivating Tamil youth to sacrifice their lives for the Cause of separatism. Such a leader is essential to revive the LTTE presence in Sri Lanka. No such leader is in the horizon either within the island or overseas. The LTTE experience has shown the limitations of charismatic leadership for militancy alone cannot win a war against a legitimately organized state.

Despite Prabhakaran’s advantages of immense power, excellent overseas support network and adulatory public support, he failed to exploit political opportunities that came in his way to achieve his aim. A few examples of his failure illustrate this weakness:
a.      ISLA: In early years of LTTE’s growth Prabhakaran benefitted from the immense goodwill Tamils enjoyed in India, particularly Tamil Nadu. However, after the Indian troops landed he became paranoid about giving up his arms as he hoped to emerge as the sole arbiter of Tamils. When India did not agree to it, he started killing rival militant leaders and refused to lay down arms as required by ISLA. He could have easily used India’s desire to avoid an armed confrontation with LTTE to garner maximum political advantage. But he opted for military confrontation that scuttled the full implementation of the ISLA due to which the Tamil community still feels short changed.
b.     1989-90: There were political changes both in India and Sri Lanka and Rajiv Gandhi lost power in India. The newly elected President Premadasa sought Prabhakaran’s cooperation to see the Indian troops out of Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran accepted it as a face saving measure after the mauling LTTE had received at the hands of Indian forces from 1987 to 89. However, Prabhakaran failed to leverage the political opportunity Premadasa offered and broke the talks. Instead, he restarted the militant confrontation again only to lose his control over Jaffna.
c.      Political killings: Prabhakaran gained notoriety by carrying out political assassination that smacked of personal vendetta. The victims included Tamil leaders like Appapillai Amirthalingam and the constitutional lawyer Neelan Thiruchelvan who had strong political connections both at home and abroad. Their elimination deprived Prabhakaran not only of sane political advice but their ability as interlocutors with Sinhala leaders and international community. This weakness showed during the peace talks 2002 when Sri Lanka was prepared to walk the extra mile to accommodate the LTTE. Another wanton killing that yielded negative results is the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar when the peace process was in force. This resulted in the banning of LTTE in 32 countries that continues even now. Of course, the Himalayan blunder was the Rajiv Gandhi assassination that alienated India and made the LTTE an untouchable

So any new attempt to revive LTTE has to have political relevance and support base to succeed. This does not exist either in Sri Lanka or India, where the LTTE cannot count on practical support on any of the major Tamil parties. The fringe parties that support the LTTE are compromised and cannot provide worthwhile assistance except rabble rousing.

Current political environment

Since 1990, despite episodic Eelam wars, most of the Sinhala intelligentsia and politicians are conscious of the need to meet Tamil demands for durable ethnic amity. The wars have proved very costly for Sri Lanka in human and economic terms. Probably, no one in the country would want to opt for war rather than going ahead with the political process over Tamil demands short of separatism.

In the post war period, President Rajapaksa focused largely on development of infrastructure and public services in the war affected areas and achieved commendable results. However, he has continued to ignore the core issue of political autonomy for Tamils, perhaps for political reasons. He conducted even the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections four years after the war with a lot prodding from India. And the TNA government that came to power has not been given a free hand in exercising even their limited powers. The continued retention of a retired General as the governor despite the NPC government’s request has not only increased their suspicion. The military intelligence breathing down the necks of civilians has undermined the security and trust of people in the government. So discontentment over Colombo’s dispensation is brewing among the Tamil population.

Despite his desire to gain maximum advantage from the bogey of LTTE revival, Rajapaksa does not seem to have given up his political options to evolve an equation with Tamils. He has been harping on the Parliamentary Select Committee as the instrument to resolve the Tamil issue. However, this has become a non-starter with opposition parties including the TNA boycotting it. They suspect it as a ploy to delay the process.

In spite of this, the TNA led NPC government has been articulating the Tamil point of view. And India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is exerting renewed pressure on Rajapaksa to enforce the 13th Amendment in full as prelude to kick starting the political reconciliation process. Under the circumstances, revival of LTTE is unlikely to be welcomed by Tamil population.     

The prolonged war and migration (both internal and external) has depleted the Tamil population particularly in Northern Province.[ix] The Tamils in these regions have lost two generations of youth who had been the back bone of LTTE insurgency in the war. Thus the sheer paucity of young people would make the LTT revival exercise a difficult one.

However, in the near term the chances of Tamil polity’s total failure to get justice from the regime could increase the Tamils’ cup of discontent. But it is doubtful even a charismatic leader may not be able to transform it into support for revival of militancy.

There is a tendency to overestimate the political hype in Tamil Nadu over support to Sri Lanka Tamils. There is widespread sympathy for their plight and political parties are competing with one another to cash in on this. Despite their fiery statements from fringe elements, substantively they have done little to further Eelam cause. Tamil Nadu police had been cooperating with the Centre in rounding up Sri Lankan extremist elements as the state government is clearly drawing against the growth of extremism in the state. So the LTTE overseas elements will find it difficult to get tangible results from political support in the state. However, the security implications of LTTE networking in Tamil Nadu cannot be underestimated and both the Centre and the state appear to be aware of it.   

Written on July 29, 2014
Courtesy: CLAWS Scholar Warrior, August 2014

 (Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: http://haridirct@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info )  


Notes




[i] Udeshi Amarasinghe, “Modus Operandi: Tamil Diaspora and LTTE organisation” June 5, 2014. www.defence.lk   This account based on Sri Lanka intelligence sources may not be wholly accurate; but it broadly conforms to the emerging LTTE support groups abroad.

[ii] ‘Lanka says LTTE network is intact’ Colombo Gazette, April 16, 2014. www.colombogazette.com

[iii]Jeyaraj DBS, “Anatomy of an aborted attempt to revive the LTTE in Sri Lanka” May 22, 2014   http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/29849

[iv] The UPFA secured an absolute majority in the 225-member House winning 144 seats, an increase of 39 since the 2004 election. The main opposition United National Front (UNP) won only 60 seats – 22 less than their earlier score. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8634008.stm

[v] The 18th Amendment to the Constitution passed on September 8, 2010 removed the sentence that mentioned the limit of the re-election of the President and to propose appointment of a parliamentary council to decide the appointment of independent posts like commissioners of election and human rights and Supreme Court judges. This removed the provisions 17th Amendment (passed on October 3, 2001) for creation of the Constitutional Council and independent commissions in which the opposition had nominees, thereby increasing the powers of the president.   See http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Introduction.htm

[vi] The Sri Lankan army chief Lt General Jagath Jayasuriya had told to Sunday Observer (dated July 25, 2010) that the army strength was frozen at 203,000 soldiers. See “SLA’s 200,000 men could face any threat – Army Chief.” www.sundayobserver.lk  However, since then there had been some attrition in the strength. According to the online portal www.globalfirepower.com the army’s strength (as per update as on March 27, 2014) is estimated at 161,000 active frontline personnel and 98,200 active reservists. This is probably correct. http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=sri-lanka  

[vii] On July 23, 1983 the LTTE ambushed a military convoy in the outskirts of Jaffna town killing 13 soldiers. This triggered politically motivated ethnic riots in Colombo which spread to other cities in which Sinhalese mobs carried out a pogrom against Tamil population, pillaging, looting, killing and destroying their property.  When thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in Tamil Nadu to escape the violence it created a spontaneous upsurge of public outrage and sympathy in India for the Tamil cause. The events in Sri Lanka created such a terror that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have emigrated to other countries.

[viii] Hariharan R (2007) “The discarded accord and the unwanted war,” The Hindu, August 7, 2007. http://www.thehindu.com

[ix] According to the 2012 census there were 2,270,924 Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka, 11.21% (as against 12.7 % as per 1981 census) out of the total of 20,277,594. They constitute over 93% of the population in the Northern Province and are the largest ethnic group with over 39 % in the Eastern Province. 70% of Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka live in the Northern and Eastern provinces. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/sm/CPH%202011_R1.pdf

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