Col R Hariharan
[This
article includes answers questions raised in a radio interview on August 12, 2015.]
Q:
It is about fifteen months since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power.
During this period foreign relations appear to have been given great
importance. What do you think are the changes in India’s foreign policy now?
A: I am no expert on foreign policy; but as a
strategic analyst I find that the basic tenets of our foreign policy enunciated
after independence still continue to be the same. Our first Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru was a visionary; he evolved the foreign policy to further his
holistic vision for India. It emphasized peace and harmonious relations with
all countries and India finding its rightful place in the post-colonial world
in keeping with its size and geostrategic location. He understood economic and
industrial development as the keys to freeing the country from the shackles of
colonial dependency and improving the lives of ordinary people. The five-year
development plans were fashioned to achieve this.
From
Nehru’s time foreign policy became prime minister-centric and has continued so,
though the practice of appointing separate minister to look after external
affairs came in vogue in 1964. Under Nehru’s
stewardship, India played a leadership role among the newly independent
countries of Asia and Africa. He chose to develop close relations with Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) which was shunned by the Western powers. He led the
non-aligned movement with emphasis on five principles of panch sheel to
avoid Cold War contretemps. Probably, China’s aggression in 1962 was a moment
of truth to Nehru as much as the nation bringing home the world of real
politick in which we exist.
Nehru’s
successors were not visionaries of the same order and they were by and large
mission-oriented. As a result the country grew more inward looking and foreign
policy became means to the ends of political leadership. However, they stuck to
the basic principles of our foreign policy as set by Nehru. The end of Cold War
and realignment of global strategic alignments have led to changes in India’s
priorities in relationship-building, but the basic contours of foreign policy
have remained the same.
Prime
Minister Modi is perhaps the first prime minister in a long time who has spelt
out his vision for India, soon after he assumed office in May 2014. He
articulated it in his Independence Day on August 15, 2014. Since then he has
fleshed out his vision at various national forums. Its main ingredients
include: boosting India’s industrial growth by inviting foreign investment in
infrastructure with emphasis on making things in India to increase job
opportunities; to upgrade digital infrastructure for timely delivery of
services to the people by developing smart cities; improve grass root public
services to provide better governance, education, healthcare and clean
environment to help maintain social cohesion with gender equity, and lastly to
enlarge India’s strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region in keeping with
its growing global economic power.
The
prime minister has adopted a personalized style of relationship building with
his counterparts in other countries, particularly with China, Japan and the
U.S; this seems to have paid handsome dividends. He prioritised India’s
neighbouring countries in his foreign visits to leverage on India’s soft power
and influence. Though he has visited 25 countries, his priority seems to be the
Asia-Pacific region and as a corollary China, Japan and the US have been his
favoured destination. He has departed from
India’s traditional low profile foreign policy projection by making foreign
interactions well publicized. Modi’s clear and assertive communication has
helped him build bridges with the Indian Diaspora wherever he visited. Though
Modi’s foreign policy initiatives may not have yielded all the results he
desired, he has gained the attention of global leaders who have welcomed his
development agenda. This is an important take away after 15 months because
given India’s massive and confusing socio-political compulsions; in any case to
fulfill Modi’s ambitious agenda would take at least a decade.
Q:
Though India might have done well in its external front, there seems to be no
progress in our relations with Pakistan. How do you visualize India-Pakistan
relations in the future?
A:
You are right; there had been really no breakthrough in our relations with
Pakistan, though Prime Minister Modi’s invitation to Pakistan Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif for his inauguration and meeting thereafter kindled hopes of
improvement in the relationship. But unfortunately, such hopes have been belied.
In fact it has worsened with the escalation in ceasefire violations, terrorist
infiltrations and attacks triggering of separatist agitations in Jammu and
Kashmir, even spilling over to neighbouring Punjab.
The
core problem in relationship building with Pakistan is its elected government
does not enjoy the freedom to fashion and execute its foreign policy and trade
(with India) without the concurrence of the army. During the last year or so
Pakistan army has enlarged its ability to influence government policy after it
became a guarantor to its survival from terrorist threat by successfully
carrying out large scale operations against the Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek e
Taliban Pakistan) terrorists. So it is doubtful whether we can expect any change
in Pakistan’s attitude to improve its relationship with India in the near future.
The first step for it would involve Pakistan government taking firm action
against all jihadi groups (patronized by the army) operating against India from
Pakistani soil. Pakistan army has a deep seated grudge against the ignominy it
suffered after Indian armed forces threw it out of East Pakistan, resulting in
the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.Given this background, the future of
India-Pakistan relations looks bleak as long Pakistan government continues to
remain hostage to Pakistan army. The recent boost to Pakistan’s strategic
relationship with China has introduced a new and unpredictable element in the
bipartisan relationship with potential to indirectly influence it.
Q:
How about India’s relations with China? Can we expect any major improvement in
India-China relations in the near future?
We
must be realistic in our expectations regarding China. Resolving the hardy
perennials bugging India-China relations – China’s illegal occupation of Indian
territory, large Chinese claims on Indian territory in the Northeast and
finalizing a mutually acceptable demarcation of India-China boundary (as China
has refused to accept Mc Mahon Line as the boundary) may take a long time. Though
the two sides have nominated special representatives to discuss the issues,
China does not seem to have an urge to bring them to a closure in the near
future. Though modalities to avoid accidental intrusions and conflict have been
worked out between the two countries, there had been no real progress on these
issues. So avoidance of conflict, rather than resolving disputes once for all
seems to be the agreed flavour of the parleys between the two countries.
However,
fortunately China’s President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi are focusing
on realising their dreams of benefiting their people through peaceful and
harmonious relationship. Realising that there was no point in waiting for the
resolution of their long standing disputes, both leaders have focused on
building a strong economic, trade and commercial relationship by pooling their
resources and geographical advantages for mutual benefit. China has
reciprocated Modi’s invitation to invest in infrastructure and manufacturing
industries in India. India has shown its readiness to join the BCIM
(Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) corridor project linking India and China,
though India has not made up its mind on joining China’s ambitious ‘Belt and
Road’ initiative in linking China to Central and South Asia as well as the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road to access Indian Ocean.
At
the strategic level, there are both positive and negative developments. India
has joined two international economic initiatives close to China’s heart – the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Bank launched by the
Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping. India has also joined
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), started by China originally as an
instrument of regional anti-terrorism cooperation, now evolving its own
regional strategic dynamics. At the same time, India cannot afford to ignore
China’s mega entry in Af-Pak region practically elbowing out India from the
scene. Coupled with the whittling down of American presence and China’s massive
aid of $46 billion aid to Pakistan (much more than the Marshall’s Plan outlay
for post-war Europe), we can expect China to play increasingly an assertive
role to further its strategic interests on our Western borders. This could emerge
as a major, as yet unfathomed, factor in India-China relations in the coming
years.
Q:
With the rapid spread of Islamic State (ISIS)-spearheaded jihadi terrorism the
world over, why India is not joining the global war on terror? Don’t you think
it would be in India’s interest to do so?
Firstly,
I would not use the Western coinage “global war on terror” to describe the
operations of the U.S. and its Western and Gulf allies are carrying out in Iraq
and Syria and elsewhere. There are a number of factors preventing India from
joining the war against ISIS. The role of those carrying out the operations is
suspect as their strategic objective is change of regimes in the Arab world
which do not toe their line; as a result an arc of instability from Libya,
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen has been created rendering at least a million
refugees. The resulting instability has been exploited by ISIS, which is a
clone of Al Qaeda. This war has been made more complex by its Sunni-Shia
sectarian conflict of interest involving Saudi Arabia on side and Iran on the
other. India has a huge Shia population, next only to Iran, and India’s role
has to take this aspect into reckoning. There is an economic aspect also
relevant to India. The conflict has affected Indian expatriates working in
these countries and further escalation of the war or spread of destabilization
would only increase the plight of nearly two million strong Indian-workforce in
this region.
There
is no strategic context for India’s participation in this war, particularly
when India has to safeguard its national security from Pakistan-based partners
of Al Qaeda terrorists. In any case, India will have to deal with ISIS threat
which could loom large at our own gates as when ISIS takes over the client
groups of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Moreover, militarily speaking, India does not
have enough troops to spare for such a resource consuming counter-terrorism
operation. Indian involvement could also worsen the operational capability of
our armed forces at home, particularly when they are already reeling from
shortage of weapons and armaments. Our first priority to should be to protect our
own national interest; only then we should consider other requirements.
[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on
South Asia, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the
South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info ]
Written on August 15, 2014
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