Col R Hariharan |28 May 2018
[This is part 8 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone
interview with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote
pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka
and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by
both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January
2017; its contents remain still valid.]
Q13:
On March 24, 1990—the last IPKF soldier left Sri Lanka. What was the ultimate
breaking point which resulted in the complete withdrawal of the Indian
Peacekeeping Forces?
Withdrawal
of the IPKF was Indian leadership’s decision. So there was no breaking point as
such. The VP Singh government in New Delhi and
President Premadasa were on the same page on the recall of IPKF. It was on 24
March 1990 the last landing craft carrying Indian Peace Keeping Force commander
and his operations group left Trincomalee harbour to Chennai.
My regret was with this action that both
the governments had saved the LTTE from annihilation. The IPKF had already cut
it down to size, reducing the overblown self image of Prabhakaran to the
realistic proportion of an insurgent leader hiding in the jungle. He knew he
was fighting with his back to the wall; he had already lost eight batches of
LTTE leadership. In any
case, after Premadasa started helping the LTTE, which had decided to collude
with him as a survival tactics and political expediency, I felt there was no
point in staying on in Sri Lanka, particularly, when the results of the Accord
were half baked and the leadership in both countries decided to forget about
it.
Q13:
Col Hariharan, you have stated that you
heard the LTTE order the killing of Rajiv Gandhi. In what manner did you receive this
information, and upon receiving this information, what actions did you take in
order to try to prevent the killing of Rajiv Gandhi?
In
1990 after pulling out from Sri Lanka, IPKF headquarters in Chennai was
shedding its troops. Subordinate formations were returning to their respective
bases. The intelligence unit was disbanded. The radio interception units which
had regularly provided extracts of LTTE transmissions were also being pulled
out. One of the last units recorded a conversation of one of the LTTE networks
operating from somewhere in Nilgiris in Tamil Nadu.
I was startled to hear
conversation in the Jaffna Tamil dialect ordering the “dumping” of Rajiv
Gandhi. I do not remember the exact wording now but “dumping” was there for
sure. “Dumping” is he LTTE term for killing (and dumping the body, I presume).
During the Jaffna ops, we had recovered LTTE “courts” documentation of judgements
ordering dumping of 102 men and women in Jaffna, who were shot dead, for
criminal offences.
I
went with the cassette to the IPKF Force Commander, who asked me not to “touch
it.” We were winding up and had no operational responsibility any more. So as he
advised I handed it to the IB Joint Director in Chennai. He was a Tamil known to me for a
number of years. He pooh poohed the idea of LTTE planning to kill; he thought
it was all brave talk. He reasoned that it did not stand to logic after the Indian troops were
withdrawn. I did not agree but he was the man responsible for
taking a decision. So honestly, I could not take any action beyond that. The
rest is history.
Q14:
What consequences do you believe the Rajiv Gandhi assassination had on the LTTE
as it pertains to the ability for Sri Lanka to reach a peaceful end to the war?
The
question is not clear; I presume it is about the impact of Rajiv Gandhi
assassination on Sri Lanka’s ability to peacefully resolve the war with the
LTTE. In fact, the assassination alienated Indians and Indian government from
supporting Tamil militants. In fact, for next 15 years the Sri Lanka Tamil
issue vanished from the menu of mainstream parties in Tamil Nadu. This
strengthened Sri Lanka’s ability to bargain with the LTTE as Tamil Nadu had
ceased to be its vocal supporter. (To be concluded)
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