India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 2 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and its implications

Col R Hariharan

[This is part 2 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017, its contents remain still valid.]

Q2 (a) On July 29^th 1987, the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed with an understanding that the Sri Lankan government would devolve powers on the Indian model to a new merged Northern and Eastern province, to be called the North-East Province, granting official status to the Tamil language through the 13^th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s constitution. In your opinion, what do you believe are mistakes Rajiv Gandhi made in his execution of the Indo-Lanka accord?  

We have the advantage of hindsight in analyzing the Indo-Sri Lanka affairs of 90s. At that time many believed that Rajiv Gandhi had an understanding with JR Jayawardane to devolve powers to the provinces based upon the Indian model. The Varadaraja Perumal government of the merged northeastern province had repeatedly projected this request to New Delhi without positive response. He is the right person to answer this question. The TULF, which was politically savvy but wasted time nitpicking on the sidelines at that time, also might be able to answer this question. 

The Accord was flawed in many ways. It showed Rajvi Gandhi’s good intentions alone were not enough in evolving solutions. Perhaps, he was in a hurry to produce results than think through problems. Of course, he lacked political experience to deal with a wily and astute leader like JR Jayawardane, who was past master in the art of political survival. Basically, India’s approach to signing an accord with Sri Lanka to underwrite a solution on Sri Lanka’s internal issue, outside its control was flawed.  This was pointed out to Rajiv Gandhi by the late Narasimha Rao (who was then the HRD minister) when he was shown the draft Agreement.  

Before the Accord was signed, India did make efforts to help work out a political solution of their own. It brought Sri Lanka government and Tamil separatists to the table at Thimpu to hammer out an agreement. All such efforts failed because none of the Sri Lankan stakeholders were willing to go the extra mile to resolve the issue. JR Jayawardane refused to see the big picture because it did not suit him. The TULF played political dicks and drakes with India because Prabhakaran had rendered it impotent. As always Prabhakaran wanted to be the cock of the heap, accountable only to himself.  

Thus Sri Lanka missed an opportunity to work out a solution without bloodshed. (I had said so to the late TULF leader Amirthalingam at one of the many meetings I had with him. He was not amused.) This was not the only occasion when the Tamil and Sri Lanka political grandstanding came in the way of evolving a peaceful solution. Their collective failure to approve President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 2000 Constitutional draft is another case in point. 

In my view, India’s attempt to use the Tamil issue and the Accord as tools to achieve its strategic goal to keep Americans from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka (probably to help out Soviet Union) clouded its genuine desire to help Tamils get their just rights within a united Sri Lanka. It confused India’s priorities and distracted its attention from Sri Lanka after the IPKF was inducted. In addition to this, India had to oblige JR’s request to send troops to save him from a possible coup, which further added to the strategic confusion.

Q2 (b): Prabhakaran, for example, stated that whether or not the LTTE accepted the Indo-Lanka Accord, the Indian government was determined to put it into effect. Was Rajiv Gandhi’s biggest blunder not giving the LTTE, the Tamil community, and the Sinhalese (the parties who would be affected by the Accord) direct input when drafting the Indo-Lanka accord?

I do not understand the rationale of this question. India and Sri Lanka are sovereign nations in their own right to sign and enforce any agreement they want. Where does Prabhakaran come in this? He was neither a party to the agreement nor one who promoted it. He was as we say in Hindi “Kebab me haddi” (bone in the kebab). His standing at that time was only as the leader of the LTTE, one of the four powerful Tamil militant groups among the 33 that sprang up in the wake of 1983 pogrom. It was for Tamil leaders and Sri Lanka’s elected government to explain the Accord to the Sri Lankan people. Rajiv Gandhi had no business to do this as he was accountable only to his own people on this count; so there was no question of providing “direct input when drafting” the Accord.

The Accord was a product of Indian and Sri Lankan diplomatic initiative at work; it was not a matter to be trolled on Twitter for the benefit of the public. However, I agree the whole process was rushed through, cloaked in needless secrecy, which gave rise to avoidable suspicions and created political backlash in both countries. (To be continued)