India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 1 Was the use of army justified in Eelam conflict?

Col R Hariharan

[These notes were used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017, its contents remain still valid. This is part 1 of the 9-part series.]

Q1: Former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon in his recent book, Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy, in the book’s chapter on Sri Lanka, Menon said the following: “The way the Sri Lankans fought the war, though criticized for its brutality in the final stages, might have taken a higher toll if delay and stalemate were brought about….Indeed, one must logically ask the question, would an earlier adoption of the more brutal methods of the last thirty months of the war have brought it to an earlier end and actually saved lives and minimized the war’s deleterious effects?  This is a recurrent problem in state craft. It is also the strongest justification for the use of atomic weapons to end World War II.” 

Col. Hariharan, do you believe that an earlier adoption of brutal methods may have brought an end to the war much sooner and saved more lives? The IPKF were largely restrained from going on an all-out offensive against the LTTE in order to avoid civilian casualties due to pressure from Tamil Nadu.  In retrospect, should the IPKF have gone on all-out military offensive (regardless of the opinions   of civilians in Tamil Nadu) to destabilize the LTTE and then work on achieving a political solution?

I have not read Shivshankar Menon’s book, except for some excerpts. So I would not comment on what you are quoting without understanding the context in which it was written. But as one spent most of his service career in operations against nearly two dozen insurgencies in three countries (including Sri Lanka), I shall try to answer your question.

Despite all the romantic notions about the glories of war, there should be no illusion about brutality in war. War is all about eliminating the enemy. So there is no such thing as war without brutality. Most of the time victory comes to the side which kills or maims more soldiers.  Bringing an early end to the war is always used to justify the use of highly lethal weapons that cause mass killings. Americans gave the same excuse to justify their use of atom bombs on densely populated cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that killed thousands of people which led to the surrender of Japan in World War II. That is an example of unparalleled act of brutality in war. Perhaps, humanity will continue to debate forever the justification for use of brute force in war as conflict and peace are the two sides of our existence.  

Many countries use regular army in operations to suppress or eliminate insurgencies. So insurgency conflicts are no different from war as far as the troops carrying out the operations are concerned, though they may adopt tactics appropriate to the operation.

As regards the IPKF, we received no instructions to minimise casualties because of political pressure from Tamil Nadu. Indian army operates upon directions from New Delhi not on political pressures of states. So the Ministry of Defence would probably be able to answer this part of the question better. 

To win wars against insurgents or regular forces, armies have to use superior force. This is ingrained in every soldier. In spite of this, India army generally uses minimum force against insurgents because of the country’s peculiar national security decision making process. That is why insurgencies in India seem to be never ending; they have even continued for two generations (i.e., Naga and Left Wing extremism). 

The Indian political system shows immense patience to work out politically acceptable compromises with insurgent groups so that they would join mainstream politics. It treats most of their minor aberrations like extortion and kidnapping merely as a crime. This is how insurgencies in the Northeast have been managed. 

But the system is not without its merit; it reduces collateral damage to ordinary people as well as insurgents. Even though it may not succeed in eradicating the insurgent group, over period of time the group loses its credibility and its popular support slowly withers away. This method does not make military sense, as it prolongs of the agony of the people who bear the brunt of insurgent activity and state’s counter-measures curtailing or restricting public activity. But it suits the Indian style of laid back and opaque process of decisions making, as well as the national security environment in which political leadership trusts civilian bureaucracy more than the armed forces in its national security decision making process.  

Using maximum force is the accepted practice of the armies the world over.  When the Indian soldier is asked to do contrary to this basic military concept, it confuses him, which can have a detrimental effect on his psyche. But politicians in India care two hoots about such niceties of soldiering; so we soldiers plod along because we are Indian and Asian, who always “manage” to get along with any system.

Generally, Indian army does not use heavy weapons including artillery and tanks in insurgency operations. Even in Jammu and Kashmir, artillery has been used on Pakistan troops supporting infiltration of Jihadi terrorists. But if the operational situation warrants, the army will use all available forces including tanks and artillery to achieve its aim.  Even the IPKF had used tanks and gunships in Jaffna operations for shock effect or in critical situations i.e., to extricate its troops when encircled by the LTTE.  

When insurgents fight as conventional forces supported by artillery as the LTTE did in the Eelam War, use of maximum force by the army is inevitable. There is no point in comparing the methods of India and Sri Lanka in fighting the LTTE because they had different strategic objectives and operational mandates.

The IPKF had a limited task to disarm Tamil militant groups as per the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The LTTE refused to comply with this and used its weapons against civilians and other Tamil militant groups which had surrendered their weapons. So the IPKF’s military action was limited to disarm the LTTE, so that its ability to interfere with the normal life of citizens is curtailed. That was how IPKF managed to restore normal life in North and East. 

It was Indian army that facilitated restoration of electric supply, telecom facilities, normal functioning of banks and opening of railway link to Colombo. After IPKF successfully broke the LTTE’s back, Prbhakaran and his cadres took refuge in the Alampil jungles in Wanni. A desperate Prabhakaran even decided to collaborate with the sworn enemy of Tamil militancy President Premadasa to get Indian troops off his back.

Sri Lanka forces were fighting against the LTTE because it had challenged the sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka. The LTTE effectively neutralized any chances of Tamil and Sinhala polity peacefully resolving their differences. The LTTE’s armed separatist struggle was indirectly aided by Sri Lanka’s confused leadership, which for long had looked for only for band aid solutions. However, President Rajapaksa changed the narrative forever to defeat the LTTE.

Much as one may malign Rajapaksa’s methods in the Eelam War, it was his single minded focus on eliminating the LTTE that freed the nation from the coercive threat of the LTTE - an extra-constitutional force that had drained the nation’s energies for two and a half decades. (To be continued)