Col R Hariharan |28 May 2018
[This is part 7 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone
interview with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote
pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka
and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by
both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in
January 2017; its contents remain still valid.]
Q12:
Both JR Jayawardene and Premadasa, had negative sentiments of India’s direct
involvement in Sri Lanka, but they reacted to the IPKF in two different ways.
JR Jayawardene used the IPKF to fight the LTTE in the north and east, freeing
up his own forces to take on the JVP insurgency in the south. Whereas,
Premadasa wanted to get rid of the foreign military presence in Sri Lanka and
when he was President he began secretly providing weapons to Prabhakaran to
fight the IPKF. How did the Indian
government respond when it received intelligence that Premadasa was covertly
providing weapons to the LTTE to attack the IPKF?
I think there are
limitations in judging the actions of the two presidents in the present
environment. We should understand the two presidents were lonely men looked
upon by most of the people to take wise decisions, when the nation was under
tremendous political pressure. They had to manage popular emotions, while acting
upon logical course of action considered best at that moment. So I would be a
little cautious in judging their actions now.
In answers to earlier questions I
have already explained my perception on why JR decided to get the IPKF to Sri
Lanka. Many Sri Lankans seem to believe that JR’s action was a devious plan to
let Indian troops engage the LTTE to free the Sri Lanka army to take on JVP
insurgents in the South. I don’t think that was the sole intention; while his
primary motive in signing the Accord was probably to be on the right side of India
to ensure Indians do not arm Tamil militants. However, the
Indian troops might have been invited to let them handle the nettlesome LTTE.
This would also help
him to be free to manage the backlash generated after the Accord. It also had
the advantage of freeing Sri Lanka Army to take on the JVP insurgents in the
South. In fact, during the first JVP insurrection also an Indian battalion was
flown in to assist Sri Lanka fight the JVP. In any case in 1988-89, Sri Lanka
showed it was quite capable of suppressing JVP ruthlessly with its own forces.
In fact, it left the JVP in shambles, to come back only as a political party sanitized
of its revolutionary fervour, retaining “Vimukthi” only in the name.
As far Premadasa was
concerned, I think he genuinely felt inviting foreign forces to operate on Sri
Lankan soil was shameful. I can understand this feeling as any nationalist
would feel the same. As far as Premadasa’s help to the LTTE was concerned, I
have myself provided copies of conversations relating to arms supply from his
office to the LTTE contact person in Sri Lanka army. We had photographed the
transfer of weapons also. Actually, we played these tapes during a meeting with the
Sri Lanka defence minister, much to his discomfort.
I personally feel the
LTTE outsmarted Premadasa, who was gullible to its overtures. He probably believed
he could cover himself with glory, if he could succeed in bringing the war to a
close. And he was not the first politician to be conned by the LTTE. To me
Premadasa’s unforgivable action was allowing the LTTE to disarm and massacre
hundreds of innocent policemen in eastern province after the Indian forces
left. It was a shameful act that only emboldened the LTTE.
In India, the
opposition had captured power and it was already campaigning for withdrawal of
Indian forces from Sri Lanka. So Premadasa’s collusion was the last straw for
it to push the decision to withdraw the IPKF. (To be continued)
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