Tuesday, 29 May 2018

India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 9 India’s future role in Sri Lanka’s Constitution making process


Col R Hariharan |28 May 2018

[This is the concluding part of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017; its contents remain still valid.]

 Q15: On July 29th 1999 (exactly twelve years to the day that the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed) the LTTE killed Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam.  Col. Hariharan, in an e-mail you told me that you met Neelan Tiruchelvam.  What do you believe is the legacy of Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam?  Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam had become a victim of Sri Lanka’s party politics. Can you talk about how Tiruchelvam became a victim of Sri Lanka’s party politics and how does that party politics in Sri Lanka still continue to this day?

I had met Dr Tiruchelvam twice and the constitutional impasse after 13th Amendment came up as topic in our discussion, but not in detail. He was one person among all leaders (both Tamil and Sinhala), who had the perspicacity of mind to resolve the complex issue of ethnic conflict. It is a pity President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 1995 constitutional reform and devolution plan, which Dr Tiruchelvam authored along with Prof GL Peiris, was shot down by both Sinhala nationalists and Tamil militants. It went beyond the 13th amendment, providing for federalism in all but name. It was the UNP-SLFP rivalry and TULF’s lack of vision that stymied the process. Its implementation could have saved over 100,000 lives in the wasteful wars that followed.

Q16: I have often made the argument that every political assassination the LTTE carried out would help seal the LTTE’s fate. I actually make the same argument in the case of Neelan Tiruchelvam and I would like to know if you agree with my opinion.  During the Norway brokered peace talks, Chandrika’s dismissal of the LTTE’s Interim Self Governing Authority proposal (ISGA proposal), aside from her rivalry to Wickremesinghe, was a direct consequence of Prabhakaran’s political decision to assassinate Neelan Tiruchelvam. 

I believe an underlying reason for Chandrika having dismissed the ISGA proposals was because there was no longer any senior Tamil politician within Chandrika’s ranks to convince her of the necessity to negotiate with the LTTE’s ISGA proposal. However, in the mid to late 1990s, Neelan Tiruchelvam (an internationally renowned constitutional lawyer) was one of Chandrika’s senior political advisors. Tiruchelvam, a man who constantly advocated engaging in negotiations with the LTTE, would have insisted that Chandrika consider the ISGA proposals. However, by killing Tiruchelvam, there was effectively no one to convince Chandrika of the necessity to negotiate with the LTTE’s proposals.

You are absolutely correct because Neelan had the ears of not only Chandrika, but other national and international leaders on his own merit. At the same time, we should not ignore the damage done by the LTTE’s assassination of other seasoned Tamil leaders like Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran, who had the political acumen that could have come in handy in negotiations. Prabhakaran was anti-intellectual and paranoid about Tamil intellectuals outsmarting him to steal the thunder.

Q17: Do you believe the intervention of India into Sri Lanka’s civil war, overall, was a positive or negative contribution to gaining greater rights for minorities in Sri Lanka?  

Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 had both positive and negative effects on the quest for minority rights there. On the positive side, the signing of the Accord made clear to both the majority and minorities that India supported a united Sri Lanka and does not support the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. At the same time, India also made it clear that it supported the Tamil struggle for preserving their distinct identity, language, culture and traditional areas of autonomy; by signing the Accord Sri Lanka also agreed to these aspects. 

The introduction of 13th Amendment to the constitution, despite its limitations, devolved some of the powers to the newly created provinces; this partially met the demands of Tamils and reduced the confrontational posturing between Sinhala majority and Tamil minority. The 13A despite all its limitations has survived till this day because it is still the sole constitutional guarantor for Tamils.

On the negative side, Sri Lanka did not implement the Accord in full, denying land and police powers to provinces as promised. There were other aberrations like inadequate processing of the merger of North and East into one united province. Due to political reasons like the LTTE’s anti-Indian acts like killing Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu, India started following hands off Sri Lanka policy.

These resulted in loss of credibility of the democratic process in Sri Lanka among sections of Tamils, who were also disappointed with India whose performance fell much short of their expectations.  These sections of Tamils including the Diaspora rallied behind Prabhakaran, who had refused to accept the Accord, denouncing Indian “hegemony” as the spoiler. This boosted Prabhakaran’s image as the only saviour of Tamil interests and increased the support for LTTE militancy. (Of course, Prabhakaran failed to cash on this by carrying out mindless killing of Tamil intellectuals and Sri Lankan and Tamil leaders. It pushed him to a point of no return.)

Q18: The Indo-Lanka accord has not yet been fully implemented by the Sri Lankan government. What role, if any, should India now play in helping post-civil war Sri Lanka in reforming its constitution so that the constitution will protect, provide and devolve economic, social, legal, and political rights to Sri Lanka’s pluralistic society?

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had given an assurance of India’s role in ensuring the unity of Sri Lanka, while expressing its expectations from Sri Lanka to provide autonomy for minorities. To ensure the follow up action on these two counts is essentially a political process of Sri Lankan people. I believe Sri Lanka people and political parties are capable of resolving the bottlenecks in drafting a constitution that “will protect, provide and devolve, economic, social, legal and political rights to Sri Lanka’s pluralistic society.” 

People have paid the price with their blood during nearly two and half decades of war with Tamil militants to understand the need for an equitable constitution, so that peace reigns in Sri Lanka. That was the reason they overwhelmingly voted for Sirisena-Wickremesinghe combine. It is a political process, the people have to take it through. So, at present I feel India has limited political role in the making of Sri Lanka constitution. 

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  

Courtesy: This is the reformatted and edited version of South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 6381 dated 26 May 2018 

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