India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 5 On IPKF and its performance in Sri Lanka

Col R Hariharan |28 May 2018

[This is part 5 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017, its contents remain still valid.]

Q8: It was a common belief of the Sri Lankan army security forces that the IPKF did not take an interest in protecting the Sinhala villages bordering Tamil areas. For example, when the LTTE was planning to strike the Morawewa village on March 3^rd 1988, Sri Lankan intelligence had intercepted the LTTE communications and passed this information to the IPKF. But no action had been taken by the IPKF, and the LTTE killed 15 civilians and injured 10.  Why was the IPKF largely reluctant to protect Sinhala villages—wouldn’t you agree that a failure to do so allowed Prabhakaran to ethnically cleanse LTTE territory from Muslims and Sinhalese?

I have always admired Sri Lankans ability to blame Indians for all the things that happens in Sri Lanka (to this day this persists).The IPKF was fighting the LTTE to disarm them as per our mandate; we were not deployed to protect all Sri Lankans at all times. This was Sri Lanka government’s responsibility as they were ruling the country.

I fear I have no knowledge of the specific instance of LTTE attack on Morawewa village. The village was among a few others located just outside the Northern Province boundary which had faced the ire of LTTE because local Tamils associate them with the Sinhala migration carried out by the Sri Lanka government. Even during the 2002 Peace Process, the LTTE had attacked the village. In any case it was for Sri Lanka government to provide protection to the village as it was outside our jurisdiction.

Q 9: Did you have any relationship with Jyotindra Nath Dixit? It is stated that Dixit was hated by both the IPKF and RAW operatives alike.  Why? Dixit was also hated by most people in Sri Lanka as many Sri Lankans believed it was Dixit’s manipulating which forced Jayewardene to sign the Accord as well as induct a foreign army in Sri Lanka.

Of course, I have met Ambassador Dixit a number of times; on occasions I have briefed him on my perspectives of Tamil militancy. There was no question of IPKF or RAW operatives hating him; we operated under different channels of command and leadership. It was for the respective leaderships to put across their differences in opinion with the Ambassador either directly or through the ministry at appropriate level. 

To this day, Indian high commissioners always have been having good relations with the Sri Lankan president, the prime minister and many of the political leaders of all hues. This is mainly due to the close affinity between the two nations and the umbilical links they have. Ambassador Dixit enjoyed very close rapport with JR. I thought they got along well because both of them were astute and canny persons in their own right. You are underestimating JR, if you think Dixit’s “manipulation” was behind the Sri Lankan President signing of the Accord. 

Sri Lankan politics is strewn with evidence of JR’s superior manipulative skills.  JR probably made up his mind to come to terms with India after Americans failed to intervene in favour of Sri Lanka after Operation Poomalai. When Rajiv Gandhi was amenable to the idea, he signed the Accord.

I would go along with many Sri Lankans who say JR saw the advantage of having Indian forces on Sri Lanka soil to do the dirty job of disarming LTTE as per the Accord. JR also had internal compulsions. He probably wanted to be ready to save himself from a possible coup attempt by army as some sections were unhappy when their Jaffna operation was halted when they were poised to round up Prabhakaran. So at his request Indian warships were kept in readiness to ensure his protection off Colombo coast. In any case, Sri Lanka forces and police proved they were quite capable and absolutely ruthless in suppressing the JVP militants. (To be continued)