Col R Hariharan
[This is
part 3 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone
interview with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote
pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka
and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by
both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in
January 2017, its contents remain still valid.]
Q3: Mr. Menon then stated, “The strategist Edward Luttwak
argues that there are situations in which one should give war a chance. Was Sri
Lanka one of them, where peace building efforts and international mediation
only prolonged and worsened the agony?” Menon asks
and concludes by saying: “These are difficult counterfactuals that go against
the grain of liberal thinking, but they do seem appropriate to the Sri Lankan
case.” Do you believe Sri Lanka was a case where international mediation only
prolonged and worsened the agony?
I
agree with Mr Shivshankar Menon’s reasoning about international mediation.
Norwegian-led mediation failed because it was idealistic and lacked pragmatism
to succeed in the South Asian social environment. Even otherwise, talks between
warring sides merely on the premise that it was better to talk peace than go to
war does not work, except to cool down the overheated environment so that both
sides are ready, optimistically, to talk peace. But usually it does not follow
the script and they go for another round of war.
In
Sri Lanka, the conflict that preceded the peace talks had led to a lot of
bloodletting by both sides and the raw emotions and trauma kindled by it had
not healed the wounds. The traumatic experience could not be papered over by
the financial incentives offered by the backers to coolly sit across the table
to talk peace. A neutral force to separate the two adversaries to ensure both
sides comply with the ceasefire terms was not there. On the one side, we had
Sri Lanka government, an accountable entity, which followed international norms
of conduct. On the other side, the LTTE an insurgent group which was a law unto
itself, fighting the state to destroy it, wanted to be treated as equal, which
it was not.
If
only the LTTE had deposited their arms to a neutral custodian who guaranteed
their security, perhaps the insurgent group might have behaved differently. This
has been tried in many nations including Indonesia, India and Nepal with
moderate success. In Nepal and Nagaland in India, chances for peace increased
as the insurgent groups agreed to talk peace even without a neutral force. Without
that such a structural framework the 2002 peace move was bound to fail because
the LTTE behaved like a loose cannon, violating the ceasefire with impunity.
This
was made easy as the government in “cohabitation” mode was paralysed in taking
the peace talks forward due to the cold war between the President Chandrika and
the Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. This emboldened the LTTE to take full
advantage of the situation to import arms to build its conventional military
capability and win at propaganda war, cocking a snoot at the frustrated government,
effectively sidelining the Norwegian peace mission.
Q4:
India and Sri Lanka also signed an agreement that brought the Indian
Peacekeeping Forces into Sri Lanka to accept the surrender of arms by Tamil
militants as part of a general cease fire.
Prabhakaran had reportedly stated that he was “not keen to give up all
[the LTTE’s] weapons but hand over some and see the Accord being implemented.”
To your knowledge, was this true? And if so, was this an unreasonable demand on
the part of Prabhakaran to agree to give up some of the weapons and then
gradually give up more of the weapons as parts of the Accord are implemented?
Actually,
I never believed Prabhakaran. Whatever he said about his intentions to see the
Accord in action, I don’t think he would have surrendered the arms. Even my
contacts in the LTTE told me so and they were unhappy about it as they thought
the Tamil Tigers should not fight India. Anyone who had dealt with Prabhakaran
would tell you that he would never give up his dream of creating an Independent
Eelam.
His aim was to establish himself as the sole arbiter to liberate Tamils;
so he never accepted India or Sri Lanka equating LTTE along with PLOTE, TELO
and EPRLF. He firmly believed it was his destiny to lead the Tamils’ fight for independence
and never factored any peaceful method that fell short of independence.
Premadasa,
who gave the LTTE a lease of life by arming it against the IPKF, ensured the
IPKF was packed off from island and ignored the LTTE’s slaughter of hundreds of
policemen, could not pressurize the LTTE to talk peace. Ultimately, the LTTE
killed him to have its way because he was the President of Sri Lanka, just as
they killed Rajiv Gandhi. These killings showed the true nature of
Prabhakaran’s leadership.
The
LTTE accepted Norwegian peace proposal only after Norway arm-twisted Sri Lanka
to accept LTTE as the sole representative of Tamils at the talks. So I consider
any talk of LTTE gradually giving up arms to ensure the Accord is at best a
joke, though in reality it was a lot of hogwash. (To be continued)
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